李麗;胡偉;

• 1:安徽工業大學經濟學院

摘要(Abstract)：

食品安全問題是世界各國普遍關注的重大問題,學術界對食品安全問題產生的原因及其治理方式進行了廣泛研究。已有的研究主要集中在食品安全問題產生的理論基礎以及聲譽機制、政府規制和供應鏈管理在治理食品安全問題方面的應用及最新進展。

關鍵詞(KeyWords)： 食品安全;信息不對稱;聲譽機制;政府規制;供應鏈管理

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金項目(Foundation): 教育部人文社會科學研究青年基金項目(08JC790003);; 安徽省教育廳人文社會科學研究重點項目(2009sk167zd)

作者(Author): 李麗;胡偉;

Email:

DOI:

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